
































I heard one speaker say, I think it was Dr. Silajdžić, that he wanted a normal demo-
cracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I’m a political scientist. My first question is: what 
is a normal democracy?1
Is it the United States, where the head of state has to be born in the United 
States? I, as a US citizen, as an immigrant, am not entitled to compete to be the 
* Editorial note. The text is corrected and authorized transcript of the presentation held at the 
international conference "The Legacy of Peace – 25 Years of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agree-
ment" in Zagreb, 15th December 2020, in the panel "Linking the Principle of Three Consti-
tuent Peoples and the Sejdić-Finci Judgement: What is the Way Forward?". The full video of 
the conference is available on the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs You-
Tube channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPu6gesgkmk). The presentation begins 
at 2:57:10 and the question posed by the panel moderator Tihomir Vinković followed by the 
author’s answer begin at 3:54:30. Since this publication comes to light in the year of 700th 
anniversary of Dante’s death, an additional remark is appropriate. For this special occasion, 
the author suggested to accompany the transcript with a similar although perhaps more opti-
mistic warning than the dull Lasciate ogne speranza, voi ch’intrate of the Italian poet. The aut-
hor’s intervention concerning the problems of democracy building in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
– unlike the case of hope in hell – should be read with somewhat ironic but still practically 
minded: "Read now or forever hold your peace!"
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Abstract the author argues there is no such thing as a "normal democracy", and 
that the decision made by the european court of human rights in sejdić-Finci case 
does not pay enough respect to consociational democracy as one of the legitimate 
forms of democracy. as human rights have to be balanced against one another, 
they also have to be balanced against other values, including peace and stability. 
as the practical solution in the election of the three-person collective Presidency in 
Bosnia and herzegovina, the author suggests three separate electoral colleges in 
the three territorial districts that would settle the tension between the politically 
viable power-sharing arrangements and the demand to respect human rights. the 
author concludes that more moral modesty is in place when foreign political advice 
in democratic constitutional design is issued for the divided societies.
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President of the United States. I don’t complain about that fact. I don’t head to the 
Supreme Court to complain about it, but it is a fact that the Presidency of the United 
States is ethnically restricted. The United States’ President is elected by an electoral 
college, not by popular majority, so is the US a normal democracy?
Is the United Kingdom, where I lived for 20 years, a normal democracy? The role 
of its head of state is filled by the Crown. The office has to be filled by an Anglican, 
Protestant in belief. The head of government, the prime minister, cannot be a prac-
ticing Catholic. Prime Ministers have to advise on the appointment of bishops to the 
House of Lords, Protestant bishops. That’s "feudal democracy," I suppose.
Is a normal democracy Belgium, which has three regions, one of which is lin-
guistically mixed, whereas two others practice linguistic majoritarianism? The Cab-
inet has to have equal numbers of French speakers and Dutch speakers.
What about the European Union itself? It has 27 constituent peoples, it’s or-
ganized according to a rigorous system of power-sharing, super-qualified majority 
voting, veto rights, and extensive recognition of cultural autonomy.
I say all this to make the key point about the decision made by the European 
Court of Human Rights that we are discussing here. It did not appear to me to ap-
preciate the variety of legitimate forms of democracy, one of which is, to give its 
correct name – consociational democracy. That’s a system in which there is parity 
among the constituent peoples, there is proportionality in representation and in the 
allocation of resources, there is autonomy on matters of fundamental importance 
to communities such as education, and lastly there are constitutional veto rights to 
inhibit majorities from depriving minorities of their rights.
This system of consociational democracy has been a partial success in other 
European locations, notably in Northern Ireland where I grew up. It has also been 
a success in the Netherlands between 1917 and 1966; it organically dissolved, but it 
did inhibit serious conflict in the Netherlands. Both Belgium and Switzerland com-
bine, like Bosnia and Herzegovina, federal and consociational principles.
So, arguably, there was nothing extraordinarily democratically improper about 
the structure of what was agreed in the Dayton Agreement. The Court of Human 
Rights, of course, specializes in human rights. It is not the general court of compar-
ative constitutionalism, still less is it the court of comparative democracies. It chose 
however to override the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on which 
there already sat international judges who were not associated with any of the major 
communities inside Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, and it chose to do so, it seems to 
me, on rather absolutist understanding of human rights.
Of course, Roma and Jews [Sejdić-Finci] and Others should be entitled to their 
full human rights in every polity in Europe, and anywhere else where they reside. 
But that, I think, was not the issue. Human rights have to be balanced against one 
another, and they also have to be balanced against other values, including peace 
and stability.  I make this point as a political scientist, because I have been a con-
stitutional advisor at many peace agreements around the world. I worked for the 
United Nations as part of its Mediation Support Unit. I’m its former senior advisor 
on power-sharing.
As a result of this Court decision in Sejdić-Finci, which has so far proved un-
workable, I would be obliged as in advisor in the making of future peace agree-
ments to advise people not to give to a regional court of human rights any definitive 
jurisdiction over any element of the constitutional bargain being struck, precisely 

































deeply regret that I would have to give that kind of advice. It is possible to combine 
power-sharing arrangements with respect for human rights, and this Court decision 
unfortunately makes doing that a little bit more difficult.
To conclude this brief intervention: what is to be done? I’m a foreigner, I’m an 
Irish citizen, EU citizen, and a United States’ citizen, and I don’t think I have any 
jurisdiction in this case. It does seem to me, however, that the Venice Commission 
in advising the European Court of Human Rights did not adequately spell out an 
alternative form of power-sharing that would not have the difficulties regarding hu-
man rights which the Court identified. What could that formula look like? It could 
involve an electoral college like the one in the United States, except it would have to 
be territorially composed. Somebody could be elected from the Serb Republic, two 
people could be elected from the Federation, but in order to achieve equity across 
the three constituent peoples, as well as the Others, there would have to be at least 
two, and better three, territorial electoral colleges inside Bosnia and Herzegovina.
I don’t have a solution to the restructuring of the Senate, and I think that’s ap-
propriate because it doesn’t seem to me, given the question of the margin of the 
appreciation, that the Court should have commented on the design of the second 
chamber of the legislature. The key question was on the executive, and there are 
ways of accomplishing the relevant objectives but the Venice Commission did not 
point them out. What I can say as a professional political scientist is – under no 
circumstances should the alternative vote be used in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That 
experiment has been tried before and failed, and it should not be repeated.
Thank you very much.
***
Professor O’Leary, you are advisor on different topics in different parts of 
the world trying to find a solution that is workable and viable. How do you look 
at it concerning that Sejdić-Finci is not implemented? What is the workable and 
viable solution?
I think it is a very good question and I was expecting to hear answers to it from 
the other participants. I explained that in my view, the easiest way to do it would be 
to have three territorially based jurisdictions. One would be the Serb Republic, the 
other would be a certain set of cantons in which there is a Croat majority and the 
other one would be the rest of the Federation. If three people were to be elected, they 
could be from any background, one of the three constituent peoples or others, they 
would all be viable candidates, and they would be elected in three separate electoral 
colleges in the three territorial districts. That would satisfy the Court of Human 
Rights and it would keep the three-person collective Presidency that many people 
want to keep. That’s a practical way of doing things.
I have no solution immediately on offer for the Senate. There I believe strongly 
that the Court overstepped the mark, because the Court usually does not engage in 
any deliberation of the composition of legislatures, particularly their second cham-
bers. So, I think it would be a reasonable response on the part of the people in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina to design a solution to the executive composition problem and 
to go ahead with that, and leave the existing Senate alone. Not everyone would be 
happy with that but I think that would be a reasonable response.
I would like to say something as an American citizen in conclusion. Americans 
cannot preach with moral authority on these questions. America has dependent na-

































Court. There is a long history of ethnic expulsion of the Native Americans in the 
United States. We have a nativist rule for the election of the President and the Vice 
President. You have to be born in the United States, you can't be an immigrant. We 
therefore have differentiated forms of citizenship in the United States. So, it is not 
accurate for Americans to preach to others that we practice a policy of complete 
equality. And I’ve said all that without mentioning Americans’ acknowledged histo-
ry – and unresolved present – of racial discrimination inside the United States. So, 
we Americans need to get our house in order before we preach morally to others 
about their constitutional design. That doesn’t mean that America has no role to 
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Što je normalna demokracija?
Sažetak autor tvrdi da ne postoji tako nešto poput "normalne demokracije" te da 
odluka europskog suda za ljudska prava u slučaju sejdić-Finci ne uvažava dovoljno 
konsocijacijsku demokraciju kao jedan od legitimnih oblika demokracije. Kao što 
se ljudska prava moraju uravnotežiti jedna s drugima, tako se moraju uravnotežiti 
i s drugim vrijednostima, uključujući mir i stabilnost. Kao praktično rješenje u izbo-
rima tročlanoga kolektivnog predsjedništva u Bosni i hercegovini, autor predlaže 
tri odvojena izbornička kolegija u trima teritorijalnim okruzima, što bi riješilo nape-
tost između politički održivih aranžmana za podjelu vlasti i zahtjeva za poštivanjem 
ljudskih prava. autor zaključuje kako je potrebno više moralne skromnosti kada se 
podijeljenim društvima daju inozemni politički savjeti o demokratskom ustavnom 
dizajnu.
Ključne riječi Bosna i hercegovina, slučaj sejdić-Finci, konsocijacijska demokracija, 
podjela vlasti, ljudska prava, izbornički kolegiji, kolektivno predsjedništvo
